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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

BECKY LOWE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 20395

SORENSON RESEARCH COMPANY,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The issues presented on this appeal are as follows:
(a)

Absent an express contract of employment for a
specified duration, does Utah recognize a cause
of action for the alleged "wrongful" termination
of an employee?

(b)

Absent direction from the Utah legislature,
should this court overturn substantial Utah case
law precedent which denies a cause of action for
alleged "wrongful" termination of an employee?

(c)

Absent an express contract of employment for a
specified duration, should this court judicially
impose an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing into the employment relationship and

thereby abrogate the terminable-at-will doctrine
in Utah,
(d)

Absent an express contract of employment for a
specified duration, should this court restrict an
employer's right to terminate employees only in
accordance with an employer's unbargained for and
unilateral employee handbook.

(e)

Does Utah's Employment Relations and Collective
Bargaining Act, Utah Code Ann. § 34-20-1 (1953),
as amended, restrict a non-union employer's right
to terminate an employee at will?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff-Appellant Becky Lowe ("Plaintiff") brought
this action against her former employer, Defendant-Respondent
Sorenson Research Company, Inc., ("Sorenson") for the alleged
"wrongful" termination of her employment.

Plaintiff's

Complaint alleged four separate causes of action against
Sorenson, including breach of an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, breach of an implied duty to deal in good
faith as allegedly imposed by Sorenson's employee handbook, and
breach of implied duty to deal in good faith pursuant to Utah's
Employment Relations and Collective Bargaining Act. (R. 2-7)
Despite plaintiff's assertion in its Brief to the contrary, all
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of these Counts, with the exception of Count III for damages
for breach of public policy, are based in contract.

(R. 2-7)

They involve alleged breach of implied contractual covenants
which plaintiff attempts to insert into a terminable-at-will
employment relationship*
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure plaintiff filed a Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's
Complaint on the grounds it failed to state a cause of action.
(R. 11-26)

After the submission of briefs and oral argument

the lower court denied Sorenson's initial Motion to Dismiss,
without prejudice, to permit plaintiff to conduct discovery to
determine if a written contract of employment existed.
53-54)

(R. 49,

Sorenson was not required to file an answer to

plaintiff's Complaint and was free to renew its Motion to
Dismiss at the end of the specified discovery period.
53-54)

(R. 49,

After the discovery, which included the production of

plaintiff's employee file and the depositions of Sorenson's
personnel manager, production manager and supervisor, (R.
50-52, 55-59)

Plaintiff's discovery confirmed the

non-existence of an employment contract and established the
employment relationship as one terminable-at-will (Plaintiff's
Brief at 3 ) . Sorenson's Motion to Dismiss was reheard before
the lower court, and the court granted Sorenson's Motion to
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Dismiss plaintiff's Complaint as to all counts.

(R. 85, 92-93)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Although this court on review should survey the facts
in a light most favorable to plaintiff, Barrus v. Wilkinson, 16
Utah 2d 207, 398 P.2d 204 (1965), Sorenson does not admit any
of the allegations of plaintiff's Complaint as true.

Nor are

the facts, other than the non-existence of an employment
contract, necessary or relevant to this appeal, since plaintiff
asks this court to create new law.

This appeal asks this court

only to review the long established Utah case law precedent
concerning the terminable-at-will doctrine.

Plaintiff

sustained injuries in an automobile accident wholly unrelated
to her employment and received health and accident benefits
from Sorenson for eight months before she returned to work.
(R. 3)

If Sorenson had been required to answer plaintiff's

Complaint, it would have noted that plaintiff was terminated
from her employment because she had been absent without leave
from her employment after she had returned to work from the
rehabilitation from her accident and her termination was in
accordance with Sorenson1s procedures for termination of such
an employee absent without leave for more than three
consecutive days.

(R. 90)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

Through a long line of cases, Utah has

consistently recognized that an employment for an unspecified
time constitutes a terminable-at-will relationship which may be
terminated by either the employer or employee without notice or
cause.

Thus, an employee hired for an indefinite time has no

right of action against the employer for breach of an
employment contract.

This law governs this case and is

supported by a majority of states, and should continue as the
law in the state of Utah.
II.

The Supreme Court of Utah has never recognized an

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an
employment contract and should not do so in this case.

The

insertion of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing into a
terminable-at-will relationship is absolutely inappropriate,
since it would directly contradict the terminable-at-will
doctrine which permits an employer or employee to quit or be
terminated at any time and for any cause. A majority of courts
which have addressed this issue have expressly rejected it.
The grounds for such rejection are sound and the application of
an implied covenant restricting the right of termination would
negate the terminable-at-will doctrine in Utah.

Additionally,

such implied covenants may only be read into express contracts
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to aid or further other terms of the contract, and as such are
merely derivative of express terms of a contract and have no
independent existence.

Thus, an implied covenant is not

appropriate in a terminable-at-will relationship since it is
contradictory to the very terms of the employment contract.
Utah case law has also impliedly rejected this argument in the
context of an employment relationship.
III. An employer's statements or policies and
procedures set forth in employee manuals or booklets do not
restrict an employer's right to terminate an employee at will.
Employee manuals or policy statements have been recognized by
the courts of numerous states as mere unilateral statements of
position, unbargained for between employer and employee, which
do not create enforceable contract rights.

Furthermore, in

this case Sorenson's employee handbook does not restrict
Sorenson's right to terminate at will.
IV.

Absent an express statutory delineation of public

policy restricting Sorenson's right to terminate its employees
at will, the general rule of termination-at-will applies.

No

such public policy exists here, and plaintiff's reliance on
Utah's Employment Relations and Collective Bargaining Act to
imply covenants of good faith and fair dealing is misplaced and
the Act is inapplicable here.
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V.

The recognition of public policy and the

balancing of the rights of the employer and the employee are
matters within the domain of the Legislature and best
accomplished by the Legislature.

The Legislature has already

limited an employer's right to terminate its employees in
several areas, and without an express mandate from the
Legislature, this court should not adopt the extremely broad
exception to the terminable-at-will doctrine that plaintiff
urges on this court.
VI.

The terminable-at-will doctrine, as presently

recognized in the State of Utah, serves important public policy
interests.

The doctrine not only provides certainty in the

work place and decreases the incidence of vexatious litigation,
but also facilitates economic growth and stability.

These

important public interests strongly support the continued
vitality of Utah's terminable-at-will doctrine.
ARGUMENT
I.
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED BECAUSE NO CLAIM FOR
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CAN BE MAINTAINED IN UTAH
ABSENT AN EXPRESS CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT.
Plaintiff's claim against Sorenson for alleged
wrongful termination of employment asks this court to
completely disregard the well established rule that a general
-7-

or indefinite hiring, for an unspecified time constitutes a
"terminable-at-will" relationship which may be terminated by
either the employer or employee at any time, without notice or
cause.

This general rule of law is the law in Utah.

This

court, in a long line of cases has consistently declared that
employment contracts of indefinite duration are terminable at
the will of either party, at any time and for any reason.

See,

e.g., Held v. American Linen Supply Co., 6 Utah 2d 106, 307
P.2d 210 (1957); Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc.,
11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 (1960)

("Absent a specified length

of time of employment, it is generally recognized that under
such a provision either party may terminate the employment at
will.").

Accord, Crane Co. v. Dahle, 576 P.2d 870 (Utah 1970)

("In the absence of a contract for a definite term, an employee
may quit whenever he desires, the same as an employer may fire
him.") .
In Held, this court, in reversing the district court 1 s
refusal to grant defendant American Linen's Motion to Dismiss,
quoted the applicable rule as follows:
In the absence of something in the contract
of employment to fix a definite term of
service, or other contractual provision to
restrict the right of the employer to
discharge, or some statutory restriction
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upon this right, an employer may lawfully
discharge an employee at what time he
pleases and for what cause he chooses,
without thereby becoming liable to an action
against him. A general contract of hiring
is ordinarily deemed a contract terminable
at the will of either the employer or the
employee. (Emphasis added)
307 P.2d at 211-12.
Again, in Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah
1979) (emphasis added), this court reiterated this general
rule, declaring:
In the absence of some further express or
implied stipulation as to the duration of
the employment or of a good consideration in
addition to the services contracted to be
rendered, the contract is no more than an
indefinite, general hiring which is
terminable at the will of either party, . . .
When an individual is hired for an
indefinite time, he has no right of action
against his employer for breach of the
employment contract upon being discharged.
This court's application of the "terminable-at-will"
doctrine has been followed by federal judges applying Utah law
to dismiss claims for wrongful termination brought by persons
formerly employed under contracts of indefinite duration.
e.g., Heward v. Western Electric Co.,

P.2d

See,

, 116 BNA

L.R.R.M. 3423, 3425 (10th Cir. 1984) ("It is essential under
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Utah law that in order to modify an employer's right to
terminate an at-will employee, there must be some 'further
express or implied stipulation1 as to the duration of
employment."); Amos v. Corporation of Presiding Bishop, 594 F.
Supp 791 (D. Utah 1984).-'

In Amos, Judge Winder rejected

the plaintiff's contention that the District Court should
follow the minority decisions that have created exceptions to
the terminable-at-will doctrine.

The plaintiffs in Amos

claimed that their claims should be allowed because the
terminations allegedly violated "compelling national policy
against religious discrimination."

In rejecting this argument,

Judge Winder stated:
Although this court has the duty and power
to mold the laws of this state when applying
uncertain state law, it may not change
existing state law. The plaintiffs argue
that none of the Utah cases that defendants
cite is dispositive because in none of the
cases v/as the Utah Supreme Court asked to
recognize a wrongful discharge cause of
action. However, the long history of the
Utah Supreme Court's recognition of the
terminable-at-will doctrine, the language
the court has used in dismissing those cases
and the failure of the court to even suggest
that it might recognize an exception to that

i/ In this case the individual plaintiffs brought
suit for wrongful discharge against two wholly owned
corporation soles of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
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rule lead this court to the conclusion that
the recognition of an exception to the
terminable-at-will doctrine would be a
change in Utah law.
Id. at 829-30.

(Emphasis added) [citations omitted].

Accordingly, in Utah, an employer's right to terminate
a terminable-at-will relationship is unimpaired, except as set
forth in express provisions of an employment contract or as
restricted by statute.

Plaintiff has acknowledged the

non-existence of an express contract of employment and admits
that the employment was of indefinite duration and subject to
the terminable-at-will rule. (Plaintiff's Brief p. 3, 33)
Thus, even accepting all of plaintiff's allegations as true for
the purpose of this appeal, plaintiff's Complaint fails to
state a claim against Sorenson upon which relief can be
granted.

Accordingly, the lower court's decision in dismissing

plaintiff's Complaint should be affirmed.
In order to avoid the effect of the Utah law,
plaintiff argues that this court should create new law, in

i/(con't) Saints ("the Mormon Church"). The
individuals were terminated from their employment with the
church-owned corporations because of their inability or refusal
to satisfy worthiness requirements of the Mormon Church.
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tort, for wrongful termination.

Despite this argument,

plaintiff's Complaint does not address its causes of action in
tort, as plaintiff now argues, but rather all, except one,
sound in contract.

Count I of plaintiff's Complaint seeks

recovery for breach of implied covenants of a contract, (R. 5)
and Count II for breach of contract for alleged non-compliance
with an employee handbook. (R. 6)

Only Count III, plaintiff's

claim for termination from employment in alleged contravention
of public policy, is set forth in terms of a tort action.
As explained more fully below, to permit plaintiff to
maintain a cause of action on any one of these theories would
nullify the terminable-at-will doctrine which this court has
consistently recognized and applied.

Consequently, unless this

court was to drastically alter the traditional rule regarding
terminable-at-will employment in Utah, it should affirm the
decision of the lower court.
II.
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED
CONTRACT WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED
Plaintiff argues that this court should recognize a
new cause of action for the breach of implied covenants of good
faith and fair dealing and thereby permit plaintiff to maintain
Count I of its Complaint against Sorenson.
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In support of this

argument plaintiff cites in Point II of her brief, several Utah
cases which plaintiff asserts supports the rule that implied
covenants of good faith and fair dealing are read into every
contract.
here.

Not one of these cases, however, is applicable

All of the cases cited by plaintiff involve express

written contracts, and a recitation of such cases ignores the
issue, since here there is no express contract of employment
and the employment relationship is governed by the
terminable-at-will doctrine.
For example, in Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140 (Utah
1982), cited by plaintiff, an implied covenant of good faith
was applied to a stipulated property settlement in a divorce
proceeding, and in Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d
1319 (Utah 1975), such a covenant was read into an express real
estate contract.

Plaintiff does not cite one Utah case,

however, which holds that implied covenants may be read into an
employment relationship in the absence of an express contract.
Here, no express contract of employment existed and
accordingly, no covenant of good faith or fair dealing may be
implied.

To imply such a covenant, in the absence of an

express employment contract, is in direct contradiction to the
very premise of the terminable-at-will doctrine, and as such
has been expressly rejected in states applying this traditional
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rule.

See Gordon v. Matthew Bender & Co., 562 F. Supp. 1286,

1290 (N.D. 111. 1983); Lopez v. Bulova Watch Co. Inc., 582 F.
Supp. 755 (D.R.I. 1984); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102
Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984); Maquire v. American Family
Life Assurance Co., 442 So. 2d 321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983),
rev, denied, 451 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1984) (Florida does not apply
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to employment
contracts); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561,
335 N.W.2d 834 (1983); Murphy v. American Home Products Corp.,
58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983); Gunn v.
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 162 Ga. App. 474, 291 S.E.2d 779
(1982); Daniel v. Magma Copper Co., 127 Ariz. 320, 620 P.2d 699
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Larsen v. Motor Supply Company, 117
Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
In Gordon, 562 F. Supp. at 1290, the Federal District
Court of Illinois held that the implied obligation of fair
dealing and good faith, an obligation which is generally read
into all express contracts, is inappropriate in a termination
case of a terminable-at-will employee because such implied
conditions cannot create an independent cause of action.

An

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing will only be
read into an express contract in aid or furtherance of other
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terms of an express agreement, and as such it is a derivative
principle only.

It must attach to specific contract terms and

obligations before it will be read into a contract.

Because

Gordon was an employee at will, the court held that "the duty
to deal in good faith was appended to nothing which had
independent life.

Therefore no cause of action predicated only

on the good faith principle may stand and Count I is
dismissed."

Id.

Such a finding is inescapable in a terminable-at-will
employment case.

To hold otherwise would be completely

inconsistent with the employer/employee's right to terminate
the employment at any time with or without cause.

In granting

a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the New York
Court of Appeals denied this same argument in Murphy.

While

the New York Court recognized that an obligation of good faith
and fair dealing may be implied in an express contract, it held
that:
No obligation can be implied, however, which
would be inconsistent with other terms of
the contractual relationship. Thus, in the
case now before us, plaintiff's employment
was at will, a relationship in which law
accords the employer an unfettered right to
terminate the employment at any time. In
the context of such an employment it would
be incongruous to say that an inference may
be drawn that the employer impliedly agreed
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his right of termination. The parties may
by express agreement limit or restrict the
employer's right of discharge, but to imply
such a limitation from the existence of an
unrestricted right would be internally
inconsistent.
448 N.E.2d at 91.
applicable here.

(Emphasis added).

The same reasoning is

Plaintiff asks this court to "bootstrap" an

implied obligation, which by law is merely derivative of an
express contractual provision (which does not exist in this
case), to overcome Sorenson's right to terminate the
employment.

Such bootstrapping has been rejected by the

courts, and is completely inconsistent with the
terminable-at-wi11 relationship.

See also, Martin v. Federal

Life Insurance Company, 109 111. App. 3d 596, 440 N.E.2d 998
(1982).
The Supreme Court of Utah in Held, 307 P.2d 210, also
impliedly rejected the plaintiff's contention that implied
covenants of good faith and fair dealing may be read into an
employment-at-will relationship.

The court, after reviewing an

express contract of employment, rejected the argument that an
implied covenant of termination for just cause should be read
into the agreement.

The court held that in the absence of an

express provision it was reasonable to presume that the parties
did not intend to limit the common law right of employment at
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will.

307 P.2d at 212. Thus, Utah law will not permit an

implied covenant to restrict the traditional right of an
employer or employee to terminate the employment at will.
The only Utah case cited by plaintiff to support this
claim, DCR, Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983),
is inapplicable here.

In DCR, this court held that a party may

be held liable in tort for failing to exercise due care in its
performance pursuant to a commercial contract to supply
services.

Ic[. at 436.

This case is wholly unrelated to the

employer/employee situation and is clearly inapplicable here.
The court did not hold that the business for whom the services
were performed could be sued in tort for terminating an
employee relationship.

Nor did the court address the

conditions under which a contract, particularly an employment
contract, may be terminated.

Accordingly, DCR's holding is

plainly inapplicable here.
Plaintiff urges this court to join the supposed
"trend" of courts which have recognized a tort action in
employment discharge cases, and suggests that Utah law is
antiquated.

In support of this argument plaintiff has cited

cases from only eight jurisdictions (five of the cases cited
are from California courts).

Additionally, several of the

cases clearly contradict plaintiff's claim.
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For example, in

Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834, cited by
plaintiff, the Wisconsin Court rejected the theory that a cause
of action based upon an implied covenant of good faith and fair
2/
dealing should exist in a terminable-at-will case.—
After
citing the decisions of Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H.
130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) and Fortune v. National Cash Register

2J
Additionally, Fortune v. National Cash Register
Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977), does not support the
claim that Massachusetts recognizes a cause of action for an
implied covenant of good faith in the absence of an express
employment agreement. In Fortune, the court read into an
express employment contract the obligation of good faith and
fair dealing. The court recognized this distinction, stating
"On occasion some courts have avoided the rigidity of the "at
will" rule by fashioning a remedy in tort. We believe,
however, that in this case there is a remedy on the express
contract." 364 N.E.2d at 1256.) Subsequently, the
Massachusetts court, in Cort v. Bristol Myers, 385 Mass. 300,
431 N.E.2d 908 (1982) held, in the absence of an express
employment contract, that the employer may give a false reason
or pretext for dismissing an employee at will since the
employer is not obligated to provide any reason at all for the
termination and no cause of action may exist.
Additionally, the Pennsylvania case cited by
plaintiff, Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 721 F.2d 894,
reh'q denied, 115 BNA LRRM 2426, (3d Cir. 1983), remand 118 BNA
LRRM 1779 (W.D.Pa. 1985) does not support plaintiff's claim
that an action may be maintained on the theory of a breach of
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In Wolk v.
Saks Fifth Avenue Inc., 728 F.2d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 1984) the
Third Circuit analyzed its decision in Novosel and held:
[w]hatever the merits of this position,
there Is as we stated in Novosel, no
indication that the Pennsylvania courts have
as yet fashioned or indicated their
intention to fashion a uniform just cause
requirement to all discharges.
-18-

Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977), which are also cited
in plaintiff's Brief, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded:
We refuse to impose a duty to terminate in
good faith into employment contracts. To do
so would "subject each discharge to judicial
incursions into the amorphous concept of bad
faith." Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc.,
65 Haw. 370, 652 P.2d 625, 629 (1982).
Moreover, we feel it unnecessary and
unwarranted for the courts to become
arbiters of any termination that may have a
tinge of bad faith attached. Imposing a
good faith duty to terminate would unduly
restrict an employer's discretion in
managing the work force.
355 N.W.2d at 838.
Moreover, the majority of courts which have had
occasion to decide this issue have rejected it.

In a survey of

states which has recently been presented with the request to
imply a covenant of good faith and fair dealing into an
employment contract, nineteen states have expressly rejected
3/
7
such an argument.—

A few of these cases are illustrative.

In Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984), an

3/ See, C. Bakaly & J. Grossman, Modern Law of
Employment Contracts, Appendix A (1984 Supplement). The states
include Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
Washington, and Wisconsin.
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employee brought an action against his former employer for
wrongful discharge.

The Washington court, after reviewing

court decisions wherein an implied covenant of good faith or
fair dealing was applied, stated:
We do not adopt this exception. An
employer's interest in running his business
as he sees fit must be balanced against the
interest of the employee in maintaining his
employment and this exception does not
strike the proper balance. We believe that
"to imply into each employment contract a
duty to terminate in good faith would . . .
subject each discharge to judicial
incursions into the amorphous concept of bad
faith." Moreover, while an employer may
agree to restrict or limit his right to
discharge an employee, to imply such a
restriction on that right from the existence
of a contractual right, which, by its terms
has no restrictions, is internally
inconsistent.
685 P.2d at 1086, quoting Parnar, 65 Haw. at 377, 652 P.2d at
629; Accord, Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 3335 N.W.2d 834;
Daniel, 127 Ariz. 320, 620 P.2d 699; Accord, Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d
293, 448 N.E. 2086, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (emphasis added)
[citations omitted].

The court also noted that such an

intrusion into the employment relationship was a matter more
appropriate for the legislature.

Ld. at 1086-1087.

In Daniel,

620 P.2d at 703, the court refused to follow Monge 1 s holding of
implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing in an
employment contract.

The court noted that:
-20-

We refuse to follow Monge. The effect of
adhering to such a rule would be to expose
an employer to a lawsuit every time he
discharges an employee with a contract
terminable at will. Under the Monge rule,
such a contract is transformed into a hybrid
contract under which the employee cannot be
discharged unless his work is unsatisfactory
or his services are no longer needed. The
Monge court resolved the issue by rewriting
the employment contract so that an employee
cannot be fired except for cause. In that
way, the Monge decision is a substitute for
a union collective bargaining agreement.
In Martin, 440 N.E.2d at 1006, the court held "[c]are
must be taken to prevent the transmutation of every breach of
contract into an independent tort action through the
bootstrapping of the general contract principle of good faith
and fair dealing.

We conclude that existing principles of tort

law are adequate without our creating a new action based on a
vague notion of fair dealing.11
Even the minority courts which recognize a claim for
breach of an implied covenant of good faith in employment
contracts emphasize that the exception should not be used as a
basis for judicial policy-making in contravention of an
employer's fundamental right to operate its business.

In

Fortune, 364 N.E.2d at 1257, relied on by plaintiff to support
her claim for wrongful termination, the court held that
discharging an agent/employee to preclude payment of
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substantial commissions which the agent had earned, constituted
an actionable claim for bad faith termination.

In so holding,

however, the Massachusetts court stressed that its decision was
based solely upon the employer's bad faith denial of
commissions which the terminated employee had earned.

The

court did not endorse review of an employer's right to
terminate.

It rioted:

We do not question the general principles
that an employer is entitled to be motivated
by and to serve its own legitimate business
interests; that an employer must have wide
latitude in deciding whom it will employ m
the face of the uncertainties of the
business world; and that an employer needs
flexibility in the face of changing
circumstances.
Id. at 1256.

(Emphasis added).

See also Shapiro v. Wells

Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 199 Cal. Rptr.
613, 619 (1984) (noting that the law of bad-faith breach of
contract is well developed only in the insurance field;
complaint for breach of implied covenant dismissed).
The judicial insertion of a covenant of good faith
and fair dealing into a terminable-at-will employment
relationship would be inconsistent with an employer/employee's
unrestrained right to terminate employment and would
completely nullify the effect of that doctrine.
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The

modification of the terminable-at-will rule would result in a
judicial rewriting of each contract between an employer and
employee and subject each discharge to judicial review.

This

court should join the majority of courts which have correctly
reviewed this issue and reject plaintiff's argument.
III.
UTAH DOES NOT RECOGNIZE A CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT UPON BREACH OF
AN EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK
In Count II of plaintiff's Complaint, plaintiff
alleges that Sorenson's employee handbook imposes upon Sorenson
a duty to deal with plaintiff fairly and in good faith and to
refrain from termination except for "good cause."

(R. 6)

Nowhere, however, is there reference in plaintiff's brief to a
provision in Sorenson's employee handbook limiting its right to
terminate to "good cause".

There is no such provision.

Plaintiff alleges, however, that a "good cause" provision for
termination be read into the employment relationship and that,
a cause of action in tort may exist for its breach.

Despite

plaintiff's characterization of this action as an action in
tort (Plaintiff's Brief at 20), it is an action based on
contract.

The minority decisions cited by plaintiff which have

held that an employer's policy manual or handbook may
contractually modify the employer's right to terminate-at-will,
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have characterized the cause of action as one of contract, and
have required that the elements of contract, i.e., formation,
offer, acceptance and consideration be present.

See, Thompson,

102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081; Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Pugh v. See 1 s
Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917
(1981).

Those contractual elements do not exist in this case.
Furthermore, the cases cited by plaintiff are easily

distinguishable from this case.

In Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at

893, the employee manual in question expressly stated that Blue
Cross would "release employees for just cause only."
Additionally the employee received oral assurances of job
security before accepting employment.

Id. at 890.

In See's

Candies, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 917, the same type of oral
assurances and the same limiting clause of dismissal only for
cause existed.
points.

This case is clearly distinguishable on these

Sorenson's employee handbook does not restrict

Sorenson's right to terminate for "good cause."

Thus, even

applying the decisions of Toussaint and See's Candies, absent
any language in the employee's handbook limiting Sorenson's
right to terminate an employee for just cause, or oral
assurances of job security, no cause of action exists even in
those states which have recognized a cause of action for breach
of an employee handbook.
-24-

The majority of courts which have considered
plaintiff's argument have rejected it. The rule of law
followed by these courts provides that an employee manual or an
employer's policy statement is merely a unilateral statement of
position of the employer, which provides mere guidelines which
may or may not be followed at the employer's discretion.

In

Gates v. Life of Montana Insurance Co., 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d
1063 (1982), later appealed, 668 P.2d 213 (Mont. 1983) the
plaintiff's employer alleged that her termination was contrary
to the terms of an employee handbook, which specified that
prior to termination for unsatisfactory performance a warning
would be given to the employee.

Ic[. at 1066.

In rejecting

this argument, the court held that the handbook was merely "a
unilateral statement of company policies and procedures.

Its

terms were not bargained for, and there was no meeting of the
minds.

The policies may be changed unilaterally at any time."

In Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52,
551 P.2d 779 (1976) the plaintiff sought to establish an
employment contract by arguing that the employer's "Company
Policy Manual" constituted an express contract of employment
which limited the employer's right to terminate to "just
cause."

In discussing the employee manual, the Kansas Supreme

Court held:
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It appears to be a general statement of
company policies dealing with employee's
benefits, insurance, vacations, holidays,
etc., as well as general operating
procedures and plant rules. . . .
We find
nothing in the manual expressly providing
tor a fixed term of employment, nor is there
language from which a contract to that
effect could be inferred.
It was only a unilateral expression of
company policy and procedures. Its terms
were not bargained for by the parties and
any benefits conferred by it were mere
gratuities. Certainly, no meeting of the
minds was evidenced by the defendant's
unilateral act of publishing company policy.
551 P.2d at 782.

Additionally, in Reynolds Manufacturing Co.

v. Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) the court
dismissed the plaintiff's argument that the employer was liable
for wrongful termination for not following the termination
policy set forth in its employee manual which required a
warning and probation prior to termination.

The court found

that the employer was in no way prevented from unilaterally
amending or even withdrawing the handbook and that such
handbooks constituted no more than general guidelines which
would not restrict the manner or method of termination.
539.

Id. at

See also, Enis v. Continental Illinois National Bank &

Trust Co., 582 F. Supp. 876 (N.D. 111. 1984)? Muller v.
Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983); White v. Chelsea Industries, Inc., 425 So. 2d 1090 (Ala.
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1983); Heideck v. Kent General Hospital, Inc., 446 A.2d 1095
(Del. Super. Ct. 1982) (employee booklet does not alter at will
employment since it is unilateral expression of guidelines);
Cf. Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or.96 643 P.2d 1276,
1278-79 (1982) (just cause for termination statement in
employee handbook satisfied if employer reasonably and in good
faith believes sufficient cause for termination exists; jury
not entitled to decide whether facts amounting to just cause
exist); Cote v. Burroughs Wellcome Co., 558 F. Supp. 883 (E.D.
Pa. 1982) (personnel policies are not part of the employment
contract when such policies were unilaterally implemented by
the employer and could be changed by it.); Campbell v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 421 N.E.2d 1099 (Ind. 1981); Mau v. Omaha National
Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 299 N.W.2d 147 (1980); Sargent v. Illinois
Institute of Technology, 78 111. App. 3d 117, 397 N.E.2d 443
(1979) (a personnel manual not an enforceable contract because
it was not bargained for nor was any consideration given); Shaw
v. S.S. Kresge Co., 167 Ind. App. 1, 328 N.E.2d 775 (1975)
(handbook not binding because employment relationship
terminable at will and employee did not limit his right to quit
work).
The only Utah case relied upon by plaintiff in support
of this claim is Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636
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P.2d 1063 (Utah 1981).

In Piacitelli, a counselor at Southern

Utah State College brought suit, alleging that the College's
decision not to renew his yearly employment contract was not in
compliance with the procedures for dismissing employees
contained in the College's personnel manual.

Ici. at 1064.

At

the trial level the district court held that the plaintiff
could be terminated only pursuant to the procedures contained
in the College's personnel manual.

Id., at 1065.

decision by the lower court was not appealed.

That final

Subsequently the

counselor brought a separate action seeking reinstatement and
back pay.

Id,.

On appeal, this court affirmed the lower

court's order denying reinstatement and awarding back pay, but
emphasized that it was not affirming the district court's
earlier ruling that the College's personnel manual was part of
the plaintiff's contract of employment.

Referring to that

earlier ruling by the district court, the court declared:
This was a final order, which unless
reversed on appeal is res judicata and
binding upon these parties. The order was
not appealed. Consequently, for purposes of
this case, we must treat Piacitelli as an
employee with permanent employment status
whose employment contract entitled him to
the formal procedures specified in the
Personnel Manual before he could be
dismissed or terminated, even at the
conclusion of the annual contract period.
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Id. at 1065.—

The Piacitelli decision cannot be cited as

precedent in this case.

This court did not decide whether an

at-will employee working under a contract of indefinite
duration may sue for breach of an implied contract under Utah
law.

Because the court was bound, under principles of res

judicata, to treat the plaintiff as a permanent employee who
was entitled under this contract to certain review procedures
prior to termination, the court had no opportunity to address
the terminable-at-will rule.

Consequently, the rule

articulated by the court in Bihlmaier continues to be the law
in Utah regarding at-will employment contracts.

Cf. Williams

v. West Jordan City, 714 F.2d 1017, 1020 (10th Cir. 1983);
Heward v. Western Electric Co.,

F.2d

, 116 BNA

£/ In a footnote to the foregoing text in
Piacitelli, the court further emphasized that it was not
deciding whether the lower court's ruling on the personnel
manual was correct. It stated:
We intimate no agreement or disagreement
with the court's construction of
Piacitelli's employment status or with its
conclusion on the rights of classified
College employees receiving annual notices
of appointment. The fact that the question
is res judicata settles those questions for
these litigants in this case only.
Id. n.2 (emphasis added).
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L.R.R.M. 3423 (10th Cir. 1984), (declaring that Bihlmaier
continues to be the law in Utah on termination of persons
employed under contracts of indefinite duration).
As noted above, this case does not rise to the same
level as the decision in Toussaint, and See's Candies,
Sorenson's employee handbook does not establish a contract of
employment for a specific duration of time, nor does it require
that a termination be made only for "just cause".

Nothing in

the handbook limits the terminable-at-will relationship that
exists in this case, and this court should affirm the lower
court's decision dismissing plaintiff's Complaint.
IV.
PUBLIC POLICY OF THE STATE OF UTAH DOES NOT
RESTRICT THE RIGHT OF TERMINATION IN THIS
CASE.
Plaintiff also seeks to avoid the effects of the
terminable-at-will doctrine by asking this court to create a
"public policy" exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.
In Count III of plaintiff's Complaint, it asserts that public
policy of the State of Utah, as codified in Utah Code Ann.
§§ 34-20-1 to 34-20-13 (1953), as amended, imposes upon
employers an implied contractual duty to "act fairly and in
good faith" and "to refrain from terminating its employees for
reasons which are contrary to such public policy."
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Despite

such a contention, this court has never recognized a "public
policy" exception to the doctrine of employment-at-will, nor
would such an exception be applicable in this case.
In Amos v. Corporation of Presiding Bishop, 594 F.
Supp. at 829, the plaintiffs contended that they should be
entitled to maintain a cause of action for wrongful termination
because the firing of plaintiffs for religious reasons violated
a compelling national policy against religious discrimination.
The court acknowledged the minority of decisions which have
created the public policy exception but held that Utah law did
not recognize such an exception.

The court noted:

The long history of the Utah Supreme Court's
recognition of the terminable-at-will
doctrine, the language the Court has used in
dismissing those cases and the failure of
the Court to ever suggest that it might
recognize an exception to that rule lead
this Court to the conclusion that the
recognition of an exception to the
terminable-at-will doctrine would be a
change in Utah law."
Id.

Utah has recognized no exception to the terminable-at-will

doctrine, and this court should affirm the lower court's
decision in dismissing plaintiff's complaint.
Although Utah has not acknolwedged a "public policy"
exception, the facts in this case do not demonstrate that
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public policy was violated.

The minority decisions which have

granted a cause of action for wrongrul termination in
contravention of a clearly articulated public policy have, for
the most part, been very limited in their scope.

These courts

have ruled the terminable-at-will doctrine inapplicable when an
employee is discharged for refusing to violate a criminal
statute, or when exercising a statutory right or complying with
a statutory duty.

For example, in Petermann v. International

Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25
(1959), the leading case on the public policy exception, the
plaintiff was discharged for failure to commit perjury before a
legislative committee.

The California court recognized that

the public policy of the state, as reflected in the penal code
would be seriously impaired.

344 P.2d at 27.

A public policy

exception was also recognized by the Oregon Court when a
discharge was premised on the employee's participation in jury
duty, in contravention of public policy expressed in the state
constitution, Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975),
and in Indiana where the public policy was violated by
termination of an employee for the filing of a workmen's
compensation claim.

Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260

Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).

However, "in view of the

somewhat vague meaning of the term public policy, few courts
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have been inclined to apply the public policy exception absent
a violation of statutes or clearly defined policy."
652 P.2d at 630-31 (emphasis added).

Parnar,

The court in Parnar

acknowledged:
In determining whether a clear mandate
of public policy is violated, courts should
inquire whether the employer's conduct
contravenes the letter or purpose of a
constitutional, statutory, or regulatory
provision or scheme. . . . However, courts
should proceed cautiously if called upon to
declare public policy absent some prior
legislative or judicial expression on the
subject.
Id. at 631.

(Emphasis added).

Similar reasoning was applied in Pierce v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980), a case
cited extensively by plaintiff.

In Pierce, the court found no

violation of public policy when a physician/employee was
terminated for refusal to work on a drug research project, and
the court held that "an employer may discharge an employee who
refuses to work unless the refusal is based on a clear mandate
of public policy."

417 A.2d at 514.

In Brockmeyer, 834 N.W.2d

at 840,—' the court, while recognizing a narrow public policy

i!/ The cases cited in plaintiff's brief to support
a public policy exception unanimously recognize that the public
policy exception is very limited in scope. In addition to
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exception, held that such an exception is limited to a
discharge contrary to a "fundamental and well defined public
policy as evidenced by existing law" and that "[c]ourts should
proceed cautiously when making public policy determinations.
No employer should be subject to suit merely because a
discharged employee's conduct was praiseworthy or because the
public may have denied some benefit from it."
In this case no clear legislative mandate has been
violated, nor does a clear mandate of public policy exist.
Plaintiff relies solely upon Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-20-1 to
34-20-13, as the mandate of legislative authority which
allegedly restricts the terminable-at-will doctrine.

This

section of the Code is entitled "Employment Relations and
Collective Bargaining" and deals entirely with the relationship
of the employer and employee in the collective bargaining
context.

It provides for the establishment of a labor

V(con't) those noted above, all agree on this
principle. Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984)
(accepts a narrow public policy exception: the employee must
prove that a stated public policy, either legislatively or
judicially recognized, has been violated); Palmateer v.
International Harvester Co., 85 111.2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876
(1981) (dismissal for informing law enforcement officers of
violation of criminal statute); Harless v. First National Bank,
162 W.Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978) (discharge for reporting
violations of state and federal consumer credit and protection
laws.)
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relations board and defines the rights and duties of employers
and employees in the collective bargaining context.

In

subsection 8 of this section of the Code, it generally
prohibits employers from interfering with the employee's right
to organize and bargain collectively/ and paragraph 17(f)
specifically prohibits an employer "to discharge or otherwise
discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges
or given testimony under this act."
The policy expressed in Utah's Employment Relations
and Collective Bargaining Act is expressly limited to the
collective bargaining area.

In subsection 4 of that Act it

states that the policy of the state is "to establish standards
of fair conduct in employment relations and to provide a
convenient, expeditious and impartial tribunal by which those
interests may have their respective rights and obligations
adjudicated."

This policy is effectuated by the creation of

the Labor Relations Board and unfair labor practices designated
by the Legislature are heard before that Board.

Nowhere in

this section does it discuss employer-employee relationships
outside of the area of collective bargaining and nowhere does
it require the implied obligations of good faith and fair
dealing to be superimposed into employment relationships.
statute is clearly inapplicable to this case and does not
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This

represent the required "clear mandate" of the legislature to
limit or restrict the terminable-at-will relationship between
an employer and employee*

Sorenson is a non-union employer and

plaintiff does not allege in its Complaint that plaintiff was
terminated for participation in any union activities.

Thus,

even in those minority states which have acknowledged a narrow
public policy exception, this case does not present a violation
of public policy.
V.
ONLY THE LEGISLATURE MAY MODIFY THE
TERMINABLE-AT-WILL DOCTRINE
The interpretation of public policy and the
establishment of laws to promote or protect public policy are
matters best accomplished by the Legislature.

In particular,

the Legislature is the appropriate forum to consider and
accommodate the competing interests that would be affected by a
change in the terminable-at-will employment doctrine.

See

Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983).
In Murphy, the New York Court, in affirming a
dismissal of plaintiff's claims for wrongful discharge,
emphasized that it could recognize the plaintiff's cause of
action only by altering the traditional at-will doctrine and
declined to do so without an express mandate from the
Legislature.

The court noted that:
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Those jurisdictions that have modified the
traditional at-will rule appear to have been
motivated by conclusions that the freedom of
contract underpinnings of the rule have
become outdated, that individual employees
in the modern work force do not have the
bargaining power to negotiate security for
the jobs on which they have grown to rely,
and that the rule yields harsh results for
those employees who do not enjoy the
benefits of express contractual limitations
on the power of dismissal. Whether these
conclusions are supportable or whether for
other compelling reasons employers should,
as a matter of policy, be held liable to
at-will employees discharged in
circumstances for which no liability has
existed at common law, are issues better
left to resolution at the hands of the
Legislature. In addition to the fundamental
question whether such liability should be
recognized . . ., of no less practical
importance is the definition of its
configuration if it is to be recognized....
The Legislature has infinitely greater
resources and procedural means to discern
the public will, to examine the variety of
pertinent considerations, to elicit the
views of the various segments of the
community that would be directly affected
and in any event critically interested, and
to investigate and anticipate the impact of
imposition of such liability.
Id. 461 N.Y.S.2d at 234-235.
Numerous other courts have also refused to recognize
exceptions for the terminable-at-will doctrine without the
deliberation and pronouncement by their respective
legislatures.

See, Fletcher v. Wesley Medical Center, 585 F.

Supp. 1260 (D. Kan. 1984) (the Kansas court would adhere to the
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view expressed in Murphy); Walker v. Modern Realty of Missouri
Inc., 675 F.2d 1002 (8th Cir. 1982) (an implied obligation of
good faith must be created by the law-making authority); Kelly
v, Mississippi Valley Gas Co,, 397 So.2d 874 (Miss. 1981) (in
the absence of legislatively provided sanctions an employee
will have no cause of action); Watson v. Zep Manufacturing Co./
582 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (if such an obligation is
read into every employment agreement, the legislature must make
that determination).
These considerations should be given controlling
weight here.

The Utah Legislature has already expressly

prohibited the denial of employment opportunities for some
reasons and none of these reasons are applicable in this
6/
case.—
In this connection, the Supreme Court of Hawaii
recently declared, after noting that few courts have been

±/
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-35-1 to 34-35-8 (1953)
(Anti-Discrimination Act, forbidding employment decisions made
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, ancestry, age,
national origin, or handicap). Utah Code Ann. ^ 34-37-16
(forbidding employers to deny or terminate employment because
of refusal to submit to polygraph examination); Utah Code Ann.
§ 34-20-8(f) (prohibiting termination for fiLing charges or
giving testimony in unfair labor practice proceeding). Current
Utah law thus indicates that the Legislature has already seen
fit to limit an employer's right to terminate employees for
discriminatory reasons or for other reasons deemed violative of
public policy.
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inclined to apply the public policy exception absent a clearly
defined public policy, that "[t]hese decisions manifest a
reluctance of courts to unjustifiably intrude on the employment
arrangement or to arrogate to themselves the perceived
legislative function of declaring public policy."
P.2d at 631.

Parnar ; 652

Thus, in light of the Legislature's ability and

inclination to limit the employment-at-will doctrine in very
specific instances, this court should decline to adopt the
extremely broad exception to the terminable-at-will doctrine
which plaintiff urges.
VI.
PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS THE CONTINUED
VITALITY OF UTAh'S TERMINABLE-AT-WILL
DOCTRINE
As early as 1877, the United States courts developed
the employment-at-will doctrine.

H.G. Wood, in his treatise on

master-servant relationships, articulated the following rule:
With us the rule is inflexible that a
general or indefinite hiring is prima facia
a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks
to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden
is upon him to establish it by proof. A
hiring at so much a day, week, month, or
year, no time being specified, is an
indefinite hiring, and no presumption
attaches that it was for a day even, but
only at the rate fixed for whatever time the
party may serve.
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H. Wood, Master and Servant § 134 (2d ed. 1886).

The judiciary

found that Wood's Rule equitably facilitated economic and
industrial development, provided the employer flexibility to
control his work place and allowed the employee the freedom to
resign if he found more favorable employment or if working
conditions became intolerable.
Although limited exceptionb to the terminable-at-will
doctrine have developed in a minority of states, the
terminable-at-will doctrine is widely recognized.

In addition

to specific statutory exceptions, some state courts have
developed a public policy exception which limits causes of
action to four types of employment discharges:

(1) discharges

for refusing to violate a criminal statute; (2) discharges tor
exercising a statutory right; (3) discharges for fulfilling a
statutory duty; and (4) discharges in violation of a general
public policy.
Will —

See Comment, Limiting the Right to Terminate at

Have the Courts Forgotten the Employer?, 35 Vander. L.

Rev. 201, 203-04 (1982).

While these exceptions to the at-will

doctrine preserve certain public vital interests, the
terminable-at-will doctrine itself serves many important public
policy interests.
Though some critics of the employment-at-will doctrine
have suggested the need for change, a thorough analysis of the
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terminable-at-will doctrine demonstrates the legitimate
countervailing interests of the employer.
should not be ignored.

Those interests

The court in Monge v. Bebbe Rubber Co.,

114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 recognized the importance of
balancing the competing public interests.
In all employment contracts, whether at will
or for definite term, the employer's
interest in running his business as he sees
fit must be balanced against the interest of
the employee in maintaining his employment,
and the public's interest in maintaining a"""
proper balance between the two.
316 A.2d at 551 (emphasis added).

In carefully balancing the

interests of the employer, the employee and society, this court
should consider the following public interests which are servea
by the terminable-at-will doctrine.

The terminable-at-will

doctrine, as recognized in Utah and the majority of states,
provides 1) greater certainty in the work place; 2) decreases
the incidence of improper and vexatious lawsuits; and
3) facilitates economic development.

See generally Comment,

supra at 223-31.
First, even the limited judicial expansion of the
public policy exception to the terminable-at-will doctrine has
created an atmosphere of uncertainty in the work place; neither
the employer nor the employee can be certain whether a
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particular discharge is a violation of a "general public
policy."

This uncertainty has arisen because of the absence of

clearly defined public policy standards by which the parameters
of a proper cause of action may be established.

Because of

this vagueness, an employer may honestly believe he is
justified in discharging an employee, while the distraught
employee interprets the dismissal to be in bad faith or in
retaliation.

The employer might thus be forced to liti9ate the

merits of a discharge that he had no way of knowing in advance
might be considered unfair.
Addressing the effects of a broad public policy
exception, the court in Daniel v. Magma Copper Co., 127 Ariz.
320, 620 P.2d 699 recognized that "[t]he effect of adhering to
such a rule would be to expose an employer to a lawsuit every
time he discharged an employee with a contract
terminable-at-will."

Idk at 703.

It has been noted that:

Judicially created exceptions to the
terminable at will doctrine without clear
bases [sic] in legislatively articulated
public policy create uncertainty because an
employer cannot be assured that a court will
not, in hindsight, decide that an employee's
conduct was in the best interests of the
state and, therefore, favored by public
policy. . . . Under existing guidelines,
the boundaries of these actions are defined
only by the imagination of the plaintiff's
attorneys.
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See Comment, supra at 228 (emphasis added).

In addition, it

has been argued that the New Jersey Supreme Court, in expanding
its public policy exception to the at-will doctrine,
has eroded employer discretion to direct the
work place and has placed courts in the
position of supervising employer-employee
relations. By creating an exception to the
at-will doctrine based on public policy, the
court has established a vague, unworkable
concept as its touch stone.
Note, Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.;

Is the Public

Policy Exception to the At Will Doctrine a Bad Omen for the
Employment Relationship?, 33 Rutgers L. Rev. 1187, 1194 (1981).
Accordingly, Utah's terminable-at-will doctrine
provides both employees and employers with notice of what
constitutes grounds for discharging an employee working
pursuant to a terminable-at-will contract.

The clarity and

decisiveness of Utah's terminable-at-will doctrine and of a
narrow "public policy" exception as expressed by the
Legislature, promotes the public's interest in certainty within
the work place.
Second, judicial expansion of the public policy
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine may also subject
employers to vexatious lawsuits.

Under the Monge rationale, an

employee may claim that his discharge was motivated by bad

-43-

faith, malice, or retaliation and, therefore, is not in the
interest of the public good.

The decision in Fortune sets

forth that an employee may simply allege bad faith on the part
of the employer.

Further, jurisdictions following the

Palmateer and Harless decisions afford no clear standards to
guide an employer in evaluating whether an employee's conduct
justifies dismissal.

Given these unclear judicial standards

the employer is an easy target of terminated employees and is
continually exposed to the threat of suit for wrongful
discharge.

Expansive public policy exceptions to the

terminable-at-will doctrine encourage vexatious claims from
discharged employees.

Moreover, often employers must settle

wrongful discharge claims out of court, given the tendency of
juries to side with the employee and the employer's difficulty
in obtaining summary judgment.

See generally Comment, supra

notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
Third, courts defining the public policy exception
must also consider the economic impact of their decisions.

The

courts have long recognized the "legitimate interest of
employers in hiring and retaining the best personnel
available."

Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171,

319 A.2d 174, 179 (1974).

Utah's terminable-at-will doctrine

facilitates uninhibited employment evaluations by employers,
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thereby promoting more efficient performance and production.
The effect of broadening the scope of the public policyexception "will be to allow the courts to become arbiters of
employment relations and to diminish employer discretion to
direct the work place."

Ici. at 179.

Further, the Geary court

noted that the continuing threat of suit will "hinder employers
in making critical judgments concerning employee
qualifications."

^d..

See Note, supra at

119!J.

Finally, an

expansive public policy exception to the at-will doctrine, as
upheld in Pierce, "infringes on the private employer's freedom
to direct his own business without interference from the courts
or any other adjudicatory mechanism."

Note, supra at 1197-98.

The exception is particularly intrusive with respect to the
managerial employees whose loyalty is essential to an orderly
work place.

Professor Blades recognized this important public

interest as follows:
The employer's evaluation of the higher
ranking employee is usually a highly
personalized, intuitive judgment, and, as
such, is more difficult to translate into
concrete reasons which someone else--a
juryman—can readily understand and
appreciate. . . . Compromise of the
employer's power to make such judgments
about professional, managerial or other
high-ranking employees . . . is especially
undesirable.
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See generally Comment, supra at 229-30., quoting Blades,
Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom;

On Limiting the

Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1404,
1428-29 (1967).
Expanding exceptions to the termmable-at-will
doctrine certainly increases an employer's hesitancy to fire an
employee.

Such hesitancy will lead not only to a drop in

production efficiency, but also to a corresponding increase in
cost.

Several courts have expressed their unwillingness to

infringe upon the employer's business judgment in this area.
See Comment, supra at 230.

Of major concern to the economic

well-being of our nation, is a business 1 ability to respond
flexibly to changing economic conditions.
Fluctuations in the business cycle, shifts
in demand, or technological changes
sometimes require firms to lay off workers
temporarily or to cut back the size of
departments permanently. Managers should be
free to make these decisions without the
threat of litigation by workers claiming
that they were wrongfully discharged. A
workable definition of wrongful discharge
can be formulated to shelter these decisions
for the possibility of debilitating
litigation.
Comment, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful
Discharge;

The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 Harv.

L. Rev. 1816, 1835 (1980).
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Increased liability for wrongful discharge
will generally raise the costs of hiring and
firing. By altering only one term —
termination rights — among a range of
possible terms, which include wage rates,
working conditions, and fringe benefits, the
court leaves the employer free to shift the
costs of the new protection in most cases
employees will eventually wind up "paying"
at least part of the new term's cost. Thus,
. . . abolition of the at-will rule will not
significantly change the overall balance if
advantage between employers and employees.
Id. at 1829.
The continued vitality of Utah's terminable-at-will
doctrine also finds support in the following economic
considerations.

Utah's terminable-at-will doctrine presently

provides significant disincentives to an employer who
discharges any employee.

Arbitrary discharges often result in

a waste or loss of recruiting time, training expense, job
expertise and continuity.

To the extent the employer bears

these costs, he will limit the number of wrongful or
economically inefficient discharges in order to minimize his
losses.

Xci. at 1834.

Further, an employer's legitimate

concern with the possibility of fraudulent, frivolous, or
nuisance suits being brought by disgruntled employees who were
discharged for perfectly valid reasons provides an additional
safeguard against unwarranted discharges.
n. 5, at 1427-30.
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See Blades, supra,

In the instant action no legislatively articulated
public policy has been violated.

On the contrary, the

defendant, in good faith and for a justifiable purpose, has
exercised sound management discretion in discharging the
plaintiff for failing to report to work.

The defendant made

reasonable attempts to preserve the plaintiff's employment
relationship; nevertheless, when the plaintiff's failure to
report to work reached the point of becoming economically
inefficient, the defendant had no choice but to exercise its
right to termination.

As noted by Baxter & Wohl, Wrongful

Termination Lawsuits;

The Employers Finally Win a Few, 10

Employ. Rel. L.J. 258, 269 (1984), "[e]mployers are not
omniscient.

Like all mortals, they can act only on the

evidence known to them."

To restrict the application of Utah's

long-standing terminable-at-will doctrine would be to paralyze
managerial decision making.

Such a restriction would clearly

contravene the public's interests in fostering certainty in the
marketplace, in reducing the incidence of improper and
vexatious lawsuits in the already crowded courts, and in having
strong economic growth and development.
CONCLUSION
Under well established Utah law, plaintiff does not
have a cause of action for alleged wrongful termination of
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employment in Utah because the employment was of an indefinite
duration and therefore terminable at the will of either party .
This court has previously rejected the argument that Utah
should recognize a new cause of action for wrongful termination
under an implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing.
Although Utah has not had to decide whether public policy or an
employee handbook should limit or extinguish the
terminable-at-will doctrine in Utah, this court should follow
the well reasoned opinions of the majority of courts that have
decided such issues, and reject them.

To accept plaintiff's

arguments would fundamentally change the employment law and
practices in the State of Utah, a function which is within the
propriety of the Legislature.

The policy reasons for the

application of trie terminable-at-will doctrine in Utah are
sound, and this court should not expand the exceptions to this
rule without a clear mandate from the Legislature.
For the foregoing reasons, the lower court's decision
dismissing plaintiff's Complaint should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

fjiU

day of June, 1985.

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

W. R6bert W r ^ h t ~
Randall N. Skanchy
Attorneys foi Defendant-Respondent
Sorenson Research Company
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EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ANT)
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
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34-20-13.

Ri~ht to strike.

34-20-1. Declaration of policy.—The public policy of the state 8s to
employment relations and collective hnrpaininp in the furtherance of which
this chapter is cnaotcd0 is declared to bo sis follows :
(1) It recognizes that there are three major interests involved, namely:
that of the public, the employee, and the employer These throe interests
are to a considerable extent interrelated It is the policy of the state to
protect and promote each of these interests with due regard to the situation
and to the rights of the others.
(2) Industrial peace, regular and adequate income for the employee,
and uninterrupted production of poods and services are promotive of
all of these interests. They are largely dependent upon the maintenance of
fair, friendly, and mutually satisfactory employment relations and the
availability of suitable machinery for the peaceful adjustment of whatever controversies may arise. It is reropnized that certain employers, including farmers and farmer co-operatives, in addition to their pen era 1
employer problems, face special problems arisinp from perishable commodities and seasonal production which require adequate considers15
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tion. It is also recognized that whatever may be the rights of disputants
with respect to each other in any controversy regarding employment relations, they should not be permitted in the conduct of their controversy to
intrude directly into the primary rights of third parties to earn a livelihood,
transact business, and engage in the ordinary affairs of life by any lawful
means and free from molestation, interference, restraint, or coercion.
(3) Negotiation of terms and conditions of work should result from
voluntary agreement between employer and employee. For the purpose
of such negotiation an employee has the right, if he desires, to associate
with others in organizing and bargaining collectively through representatives of his own choosing, without intimidation or coercion from any
source.
(4) It is the policy of the state, in order to preserve and promote the
interests of the public, the employee, and the employer alike, to establish
standards of fair conduct in employment relations and to provide a convenient, expeditious and impartial tribunal by which these interests may
have their respective rights and obligations adjudicated.
History: C. 1953, 34-20-1, enacted by L.
1069, ch. 85, § 14.
Cross-Reference.
Injunctions in labor disputes, 31-19 2 ci
seq.
„ „ 4
,r> r
CoUatcrai References.
Labor H e l a t i o n s C ^ I T I .

."1 C..J.S. Labor isolations ^; U:».
-IS Am. J u r . lM 7o2, L.'ibor and
Relations § 119S.

Labor

Subjects of m a n d a t o r y collective bar£.iining under Federal Labor I l l a t i o n s
Act
» 1 2 A« L« R ' 2 d 2 6 5 «

34-20-2. Definitions.—As used in this chapter:
(1) The word "person" includes one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees
in bankruptcy or receivers.
(2) The word "employer" includes any person acting in tlie interest
of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include the Tinted
States, or any state or political subdivision thereof, or any person subject
to the Railway Labor Act [45 U.S.C. 151 ot seq.], or any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer), or any corporation or
association operating a hospital if no part of the net earnings inures to
the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, or anyone acting
in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.
(3) The word "employee" includes any employee, but shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this chapter explicitly
states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased
as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or
because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other
regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include
any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic
service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employer by
his parent or spouse.
(4) The word "representatives" includes any individual or labor
organization.
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(5) The words "labor organization'' mean any organization of any
kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in
which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or
in part of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes,
wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
(6) The word "commerce" means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication within the state of Utah.
(7) The words ^affecting commerce" mean in commerce, or burdening
or obstructing commerce or the free How of commerce, or having led or
tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or
the free flow of commerce within the state of Utah.
(8) The words "unfair labor practice" mean any unfair labor practice
listed in section 34-20-8.
(9) The words "labor dispute" mean any controversy between an
employer and the majority of his employees in a collective bargaining
unit concerning the right or process or details of collective bargaining or
the designation of representatives.
(10) The words "secondary boycott" include combining or conspiring
to cause or threaten to cause injury to one with whom no labor dispute
exists, whether b y : (a) withholding patronage, labor, or other beneficial
business intercourse; (b) picketing; (c) refusing to handle, install, use, or
work on particular materials, equipment, or supplies; or (d) by any other
unlawful means, in order to bring him against his will into a concerted plan
to coerce or inflict damage upon another.
(11) The word "election" means a proceeding in which the employees in a collective bargaining unit cast a secret ballot for collective
bargaining representatives or for any other purpose specified in this chapter
and >shall include elections conducted by the board or by any tribunal
having competent jurisdiction or whose jurisdiction was accepted by the
parties.
(12) The words "labor relations board" mean the industrial commission of Utah.
Hibtory: C. l(Jf>3, 34-20-2, enacted by L.
1^69, ch. 85, § 15.

34-20-3. Labor relations board.—(1) The industrial commission of
Utah is designated as the labor relations board for the state of Utah.
(2) A vacancy in the board shall not impair the right of the remaining
members to exercise all the powers of the board, and two members of the
board shall at all times constitute a quorum. The board shall have an official
seal which shall be judicially noticed.
(3) The board shall at the close of each fiscal year make a report in
writing to the legislature and to the governor stating in detail the cases it
has heard, the decisions it has rendered, the names, salaries and duties of
all employees and officers in the employ or under the supervision of the
board, and an account cf ail moneys it lias disbursed.
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History: C. 1953, 34-20-3, enacted
L. 196L\ ch. 85, § 16.

by

Cross-References.
Board of labor to be provided, Const.
Art. X V I , § 2.
Indu&trial cotumib&iou, Title 35.
Function of board.
The function of the labor relations
board is not to provide leadership for a
union. Vnles«« there is evidence of company interference, the action of the union
membership in choosing their officers and
in directing their activities i* no concern
to the hoard. I'tah Poultry Producers' Coop. A*>n. v Utah Labor Kelutioiis h o a r d ,
U'O l \ Ut>4, 149 P. 2d 043.
Nature and jurisdiction of board.
The I ' t a h Labor d e l a t i o n s Board is a

creature of s t a t u t e and any actiou brought
by it is a special one under a s t a t u t o r y
provision; therefore, there is no presumption of jurisdiction. Furbroedrra Agricultural Co-op. v. W i o l e y , 1<>2 U. f.01, 132 P .
2d 384.
Collateral References.
Labor KelationsC=>"nl.
."WA C.J.S. Labor Relations § ."01.
48 Am. J u r . 2d 727, Labor and Labor
K< lations § 1 l.V> et seq.
Lnfoiveiueut of labor board's order
a^.iil^t « luplov er's Mo ci hsora, a.^i^us, or
tlie llbe, 4»i A.'L. P. 2d ."ii»2.
S t a t e ' s power to enjoin violation of collective labor contract as affected by federal labor relations acts, :'.2 A. L. II. 2d S2D.

34-20-4. Labor relations board — Employees — Agencies — Expenses.
—(1) The board may employ an executive secretary, attorneys, examiners, and may employ such other employees with regard to existing laws applicable to the employment and compensation of oflBcers and employees of
the state as it may from time to time find necessary for the proper performance of its duties. The board may establish or utilize such regional, local, or
other agencies, and utilize such voluntary and uncompensated services, as
may from time to time be needed. Attorneys employed under this section
may, at the direction of the board, appear for and represent the board in
any case in court. Nothing in this act shall be construed to authorize the
board to employ individuals for the purpose of conciliation or mediation (or
for statistical work) where and if such service may be obtained from the
department of labor.
(2) All of the expenses of the board, including the necessary traveling
expenses, incurred by the members or employees of the board under its
orders, shall be allowed and paid on the presentation of itemized vouchers
therefor approved by the board or by any individual it designates for
the purpose.
History: C. 1953, 34-20-4, enacted
L. 1969, ch. 85, § 17.

by

34-20-5. Labor relations board—Offices—Jurisdiction—Member's participation in case.—The principal office of the board shall be at the state
capitol, but it may meet and exercise any or all of its powers at any other
place. The board may, by one or more of its members or by such agents or
agencies as it may designate, prosecute any inquiry necessary to its functions in any part of the state. A member who participates in such inquiry
shall not be disqualified from subsequently participating in a decision of
the board in the same case.
History: C. 1953, 34-20-5, enacted
L. 1969, ch. 85, § 18.

by
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34-20-6. Labor relations board—Rules and regulations.—The board shall
have authority from time to time to make, amend and rescind such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
act. Such rules and regulations shall be effective upon publication in the
manner in which the board shall prescribe.
History: 0. 1953, 34-20-6, enacted by
L. 1969, ch. 85, § 19.

Collateral References.
Labor RelationsC=>513.
f)lA C.J.S. Labor Relations §517.

34-20-7. Organization and collective bargaining—Employees' rights.—
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; and such employees shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities.
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 34-20-7, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 85, § 20.

48 Am. J u r . 2d 752, Labor and
Relations §1198.

Collective bargaining agreement.
Although there is an express provision
in the contract t h a t employer cannot discharge an employee for lawful union activities, it is presumed t h a t the p a r t i e s do
not intend to limit the common-law r i g h t
of the parties to discharge or leave employment at the will of either, in the absence of an express provision or any provision in the agreement from which this
can be implied. Held v. American Linen
Supplv Co., 6 U. (2d) 106, 307 P . 2d 210.

Construction and effect of termination
and automatic renewal provisions in rollectivc bargaining agreements, 17 A. L. R.
2d 754.
Continuance or termination of labor
union's status or a u t h o r i t y as b a r g a i n i n g
agent. 42 A. L. R. 2d 1415.
Multi-employ»'r group as appropriate
bargaining unit under Labor Relations
Act, 12 A. L. R. 3d 805.
Right of individual ernplovee to enforce
collective labor agreement* against emplover, 18 A. L. R. 2d 352.
{{^h^
o f c o i I o i . t i v o :iC fion by employees as declared in § 7 of National Labor
Relations Act (20 I ' . S . C , § 157), *» A. L. R.
2d 416.
Severability of provisions in collectivo
bargaining labor contracts, I I A. L. R. 2d
S46.
Subjects of mandatory collective bargaining under Federal Labor Relations
Act, 12 A. L. R. 2d 265.

Union membership not a prerequisite.
Membership in the union is not a prerequisite to designating it as b a r g a i n i n g
agent. I n t e r n a t i o n a l Union of Operating
Engineers, Local No. 354 v. Industrial
Comm. of Utah, 101 U. 139, 119 P. 2d 243.
Collateral References.
Labor RelationsC=»171.
51 C.J.S. Labor Relations § 148.

Labor

34-20-8. Unfair labor practices.—(1) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer, individually or in concert with others:
(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in section 34-20-7.
(b) To dominate or interfere with the formation or administration
of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it;
provided, that subject to rules and regulations made and published by
the board pursuant to section 34-20-6, an employer shall not be prohibited
from permitting employees to confer with him during working hours
without loss of time or pay.
(c) By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term of condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization; provided, that nothing in this act shall
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preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization (not established, maintained or assisted by any action defined in this
act as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment,
membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the
employees as provided in subsection 34-20-9 (1) in the appropriate collective bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made.
(d) To refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of a
majority of his employees in any collective bargaining unit; provided, that,
when two or more labor organizations claim to represent a majority of
the employees in the bargaining unit, the employer shall be free to file with
the board a petition for investigation of certification of representatives and
during the pendency of such proceedings the employer shall not be deemed
to have refused to bargain.
(e) To bargain collectively with the representatives of less than a
majority of his employees in a collective bargaining unit.
(f) To discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee hecause he has filed charges or given testimony under this act.
(2) Tt shall be an unfair labor practice for an employee individually or
in concert with others:
(a) To coerce or intimidate an employee in the enjoyment of his legal
rights, including those guaranteed in section 34-20-7, or to intimidate his
family, picket his domicile, or injure the person or property of such employee or his family.
(b) To coerce, intimidate or induce an employer to interfere wit); any
of his employees in the enjoyment of their legal rights, including those
guaranteed in section 34-20-7, or to engage in any practice with regard to
his employees which would constitute au unfair labor practice if undertaken by him on his own initiative.
(c) To co-operate in engaging in, promoting, or inducing picketing
(not constituting an exercise of constitutionally guaranteed free speech),
boycotting or any other overt concomitant of a strike unless a majority in
a collective bargaining unit of the employees of an employer against whom
such acts are primarily directed have voted by secret ballot to call a
strike.
(d) To hinder or prevent, by mass picketing, threats, intimidation,
force, or coercion of any kind the pursuit of any lawful work or employment, or to obstruct or interfere with entrance to or egress from any
place of employment, or to obstruct or interfere with free and uninterrupted use of public roads, streets, highways, railways, airports, or other
ways of travel or conveyance.
(e) To engage in a secondary boycott; or to hinder or prevent, by
threats, intimidation, force, coercion, or sabotage, the obtaining, use or
disposition of materials, equipment, or services; or to combine or conspire
to hinder or prevent the obtaining, use or disposition of materials, equipment or services, provided, however, that nothing herein shall prevent
sympathetic strikes in support of those in similar occupations working for
other employers in the same craft.
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(f) To take unauthorized possession of property of flic employer.
(3) It shall be an unfair labor practice for any person to do or cause
to be done on behalf of or in the interest of employers or employees, or in
connection with or to influence the outcome of any controversy as to employment relations, any act prohibited by subsection? (1) and (2) of this
section.
word " p i c k e t " printed thereon, and with
several men congregated about hailing
approaching motorists and notifying them
there is no work because of a labor dispute is peaceful picketing and, therefore,
cornea under the exception contained in
parentheses in subsec. ( 2 ) ( c ) as an exercise of free speech. I n t e r n a t i o n a l Union
of Operating Engineers, Local No. 3 v.
Utah Labor Relations Board, 115 U. 183,
203 P. 2d 404.

H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 34-20-8, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 85, § 21.
Cross-Heferences.
Blacklisting forbidden, Const. Art. X I I ,
§ 19; 34-24-1.
Exchange
of
blacklists
prohibited,
Uonst. Art. X V I , § 4 .
Charitable institutions.
Fact flint hospital is a nonprofit charitable institution does not exclude it from
Utah Labor d e l a t i o n s Act; and where
union has been certified as exclusive bargain in g agent r*nr the employees and the
labor relations board has ordered the hospital to enter into collective b a r g a i n i n g
with the union, the hospital is required
to complv. Utah Labor Relations Board v.
Utah VaUev Hospital, 120 U. 463, 235 P.
2d 320, 2»? A. L. R. 2d 1012.

Collateral References.
Labor Re!ationsC=>3f»L
51A U.J.S. Labor Nidations 8 32*.
48 Am. J u r . 2d 377, Labor and Labor
Relations § 539 et se<{.
Discontinuance or suspension by employer of" all or part of his operations, or lockout of emplovees, as unfair labor practice,
20 A. L. 1?. 3d 403.
Employer's decision to have work done
by independent contractors rather than by
emplovees as unfair labor practice, 6 A.
L. R. 3d 11 IS.
Period of limitations or laches to be applied under 21) U.S.C., §5$ 1S.">, 1*7. in action
for brearh of labor contract, or damages
from unfair labor practice, 19 A. L. R. 3d

Conflict of laws.
Federal s t a t u t e empowering National
Labor Relations Board to cede its jurisdiction over unfair labor practices affecting
commerce to state agency, with certain
exceptions, is the exclusive means whereby stat'.s may a--t regarding matters which
Congress has entrusted to the National
Labor Relations Board; therefore, Utah
h b o r relations board has no power to
handle unfair labor charges within the
jurisdiction of the national board where
the national board has not ceded jurisdiction to the Utah board, although the national board has declined to exercise its
jurisdiction. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations
Loard, 353 IT. S. 1, 1 L. Ed. 601, 77 S. Ct.
598, reversing 5 U. (2d) 68, 2!>tS P. 2d 733.
Federal legislation applies to labor-management relations in businesses involving
interstate commerce and such federal legislation prevails over state law when the
two conflict, but the conflict must be definite and irreconcilable. Utah Labor Relations Board v. Utah Vallev Hospital, 120
U. 463, 235 P. 1M 520, 2o A* L. R. 2d 1012.

K>:H.

Removal of ail or part of operations to
new location as unfair labor practice, 5
A. L. R. 3d 733.
Request or demand for. or refusal of,
transcription or recording of bargaining
sessions or grievance negotiations as unfair labor practice, 24 A. L. R. 3d 70o*.
Validity and construction of state statutes making breath of a collective labor
<*nn tract an unfair labor practice, 30 A. L.
R. 3d 131.
What constitutes ''financial or other support" within $ S ( a ) ( 2 ) [29 U.S.C.. § ] 5 S
( a ) ( 2 ) ] making such support of a union an
unfair labor practice, lu A. L. R. 3d Sol.
L a w Reviews.
Labor Law—Unfair Labor Practices—
l T nion Discipline of Supervisors Who Are
Performing Rank-and-Filc S t r u c k Work Is
Xot an Unfair Labor Practice, 87 H a r v .
L. Rev. 458.

Peaceful picketing.
P a r k i n g a car on a roadway near the
company's road construction camp, placing
a placard or banner on the car with the

(1)

34-20-9o Collective bargaining—Representatives—Powers of board.—
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective
21
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bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
such purposes shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in
such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rate of
pay, wages, hours of employment, and of other conditions of employment,
provided that any individual employee or a group of employees shall have
the right at any time to present grievances to their employer.
(2) The board shall decide in each case whether, in order to ensure
to employees the full benefit of their right to self-organization and to
collective bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate the policies of this act,
the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the
employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision of same.
(3) Whenever a question affecting intrastate commerce or the orderly
operation of industry arises concerning the representation of employees,
the board may investigate such controversy and certify to the parties in
writing, the name or names of the representatives that have been designated
or selected. Tn any such investigation, the board shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice, either in conjunction with a properdins
under section 34-20-10, or otherwise, and may take a secret ballot of
employees, or utilize any other suitable method to ascertain such representatives.
(4) Whenever an order of the board made pursuant to subsection
34-20-10 (3) is based in whole or in part upon facts certified following an
investigation pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, and there is a
petition for the enforcement or review of such order, such certification and
the record of such investigation shall be included in the transcript of the
entire record required to be filed under subsections 34-20-10 (^ or 34-2010 (6), and thereupon the decree of the court enforcing, modifying, or
setting aside in whole or in part the order of the board shall be made and
entered upon the pleadings, testimony and proceedings set forth in such
transcript.
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 34-20-9, enacted b y L.
1969, Ch. 85, § 22.
Construction and application.
F o r m e r suhsec. ( c ) , present subsec. (3)
of this section is practically identical
with a section of W a g n e r Act and, therefore, i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
given by federal
. o u r t s is considered. Southeast F u r n i t u r e
Co. v. I n d u s t r i a l Comm., 100 U. 154, 111
P
- 2 d 153I n d u s t r i a l beard can only mnke an order d e s i g n a t i n g b a r g a i n i n g agent under
this section and is without power to enter
additional order compelling employer to
bargain with the named agent as this mav
only be done after a proper complaint
e h a r g i n g unfair labor practices is filed.
Southeast F u r n i t u r e Co. v. I n d u s t r i a l
fomm., 100 U. 154. H I P . 2d 153.
T'nder this section the legislature did
not intend to require the same formality
in hearings and pleadings that it did in

*e,-tinn relating to unfair labor prnctir<\s #
Hotel Utah Co. v. Industrial r 0 n t m „ 116
I r . 225, 209 P. 2d 235.
_,
. . .
.A Al
, ..
The s t a t u t e permit* the selection of a
b a r g a i n i n g representative bv anv suitr.ble
m ( . r h o , ^ a n d t h e ] C gis1ature*bas 'given the
i i r n r ( | t n „ r o v , r r t o :^ccrf:]\n
the will of
t n e ninjoritv of a given group of cmplovfMtQ b v m r n n s o t n o r than an election. Hotel
r t a h ' C o . v. I n d u s t r i a l Cnnim., 116 V. 443,
211 P. 2d 200, affirming 116 U. 225, 209 P.
2d 235.
Appeal and review.
Orders made under this section are not
appealable, but when an order is made un<] e r u n f a i r labor practices section, 34-20m . and properlv appealed, the court m a v
properlv ronsidcr and review the order ent o r C ( j x;nt\VT
t n i s a c t i o n with the final or.
<Vr issued under the other. Southeast
F u r n i t u r e Co. v. I n d u s t r i a l Comm., 100 \\
154, 111 P. 2d 153.
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Jurisdiction.
Utah industrial commission docs not
have jurisdiction to ascertain, determine
or certify the collective bargaining representative of employees of corporation
whose business effects commerce as defined by subds. (6) and ( 7 ) , sec. *J, of the
National Labor Relations Act. National
Labor Relations Board v.
Industrial
Comm. of S t a t e of Utah, S4 F . Supp. 593.
Union membership not a prerequisite.
Membership in the union is not a prerequisite to designating it as b a r g a i n i n g
agent. I n t e r n a t i o n a l Union of Operating
Engineers, Local No. 35^ v. I n d u s t r i a l
Comm. of Utah, 101 U. 139, 119 P . 2d 243.
Collateral References.
Labor RclationsC=>191.
Zi C.J.S. Labor Relations § 10*2.
48 Am. J u r . 2d 319, Labor and Labor
Relations § 438 et seq.

34-20-10

Combination of separate plants or units
of .same employer as single b a r g a i n i n g
unit, 12 A. L. R.":M 787.
Duty of furnishing information to einp!o\ee representatives, under National Labor Relations Acts, 2 A. L. U. 3d 880.
Effect of alleged misstatements or misrepresentations in campaign literature,
material, or leaflets on validity of representation election, 3 A. L. R. 3d 8S9.
Multi-employer group as appropriate
b a r g a i n i n g unit under Labor Relations
Act, 12 A. L. K. 3d S0."3.
Rights of collective action by employees as declared in § 7 of National Labor
Kelations Act (29 U.S.C., § 157), 6 A. U It.
1M 41(3.
Union's representations concerning initiation t i e s or dues as affecting its status as
b a r g a i n i n g representative, 13 A. L. R. 3d
990.

34-20-10. Unfair labor practices—Powers of board to prevent—Procedure—Review.—(1) The board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to
prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice, as listed in
section 34-20-8, affecting intrastate commerce or the orderly operation of
industry. This power shall be exclusive and shall not be affected by any
other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established
by agreement, code, law or otherwise.
(2) Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is
engaged in any such unfair labor practice, the board, or any agent or
agency designated by the board for such purposes, shall have power to
issue and cause to be served upon such person a complaint stating the
charges in that respect and containing a notice of hearing before the
board or a member of it, or before a designated agent or agency at a
place therein fixed, not less than five days after the serving of the
complaint. Any such complaint may be amended by the member, agent, or
agency conducting the hearing or the board in its discretion at any time
prior to the issuance of an order based thereon. The person so complained
of shall have the right to file an answer to the original or amended complaint and to appear in person or otherwise and give testimony at the
place and time fixed in the complaint. In the discretion of the member,
agent or agency conducting the hearing or the board, any other person
may be allowed to intervene in the said proceeding and to present testimony. In any such proceeding the rules of evidence prevailing in courts
of law or equity shall be controlling.
(3) The testimony taken by such member, agent, or agency or the
board shall be reduced to writing and filed with the board. Thereafter, in
its discretion, the board upon notice may take further testimony or hear
argument. If upon all the testimony taken the board shall be of the
opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the board shall state its findings
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of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such person ait order
to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice and to take such
affirmative action, including reinstatement of employees with or without
back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this act. Such order may
further require such person to make reports from time to time showing the
extent to which it has complied with the order. If upon all the testimony
taken the board shall be of the opinion that no person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then
the board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue an order dismissing
the complaint.
(4) Until a transcript of the record in a case shall have been filed in
a court, as hereinafter provided, the board may at any time, upon reasonable
notice and in such manner as it may deem proper, modify or set aside,
in whole or in part, any finding or order made or issued by it.
(5) The board shall have power to petition the Supreme Court of
Utah for the enforcement of such order and for appropriate temporary
relief or restraining order and shall certify and file in the court a transcript of the entire record in the proceeding, including the pleadings and
testimony upon which such order was entered and the findings and order
of the board. Upon such filing, the court shall cause notice thereof to be
served upon such person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction of the
proceeding and of the question determined therein and shall have power
to grant such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and
proper and to make and enter upon the pleadings, testimony, and proceedings set forth in such transcript a decree enforcing, modifying, and
enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order
of the board. No objection that has not been urged before the board, its
member, agent or agency, shall be considered by the court, unless the
failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of
extraordinary circumstances. The findings of the board as to the facts,
if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive. If either party shall apply
to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence and shall show to
the satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence is material and
that there were reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence
in the hearing before the board, its member, agent or agency, the court may
order such additional evidence to be taken before the board, its member,
agent or agency, and to be made part of the transcript. The board may
modify its findings as to the facts, or make new findings, by reason of
additional evidence so taken and filed, and it shall file such modified or
new findings, which, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive, and shall
file its recommendations, if any, for the modification or setting aside of its
original order. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall be exclusive and
its judgment and decree shall be final.
(6) Any person aggrieved by a final order, the board grauting or
denying in whole or in part the relief sought, may obtain a review of
such order in the Supreme Court of Utah by filing in such court a written
petition praying that the order of the board be modified or set aside. A
copy of such petition shall be forthwith served upon the board, and the
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ggrieved party shall file in tlie court a transcript of tlie entire record
u tlie proceeding, certified by the board, including tlie pleading and testimony upon which the order complained of was entered and the findings
ind order of the board. Upon such filing, the court shall proceed in the same
nanner as in the case of an application by the board under subsection (5)
)f this section and shall have the same exclusive jurisdiction to grant to
,he board such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just
md proper, and in like manner to make and enter a decree enforcing,
modifying' and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in
part the order of the board; and the findings of the board as to the facts,
if supported by evidence, shall in like manner be conclusive.
(7) The commencement of proceedings under subsections (5) or (6)
of this section shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as
a stay of the board's order.
(8) Petitions filed under this act shall be heard expeditiously, and
if possible within ten days after they have been docketed.
History: C. 1953, 34-20-10, enacted by
L. 1969, ch. 85, § 23.
Construction and application.
Much of the former section is derived
from a similar section of the Wagner A c t ;
therefore, interpretation by federal courts
of this and other similar sections is considered. Southeast F u r n i t u r e Co. v. Industrial Comm., 100 U. 134, 111 P . 2d 153.
To compel an employer to bargain with
agent designated according to former section 34-1-9, present 34-20-9, board must
await charge of unfair practices and filing of complaint under this section, and
cannot short circuit procedure by ordering
employer to bargain with agent at time of
designation. Southeast F u r n i t u r e Co. v.
Industrial Comm., 100 U. 154, 111 P . 2d
153.
Utah labor relations board is a creature
of statute and any action brought by it
against an employer is a special one
brought under a s t a t u t o r y provision; there
is no presumption of jurisdiction. Furbreeders Agricultural Coup. v. Wiesley, 102
U. 601, 132 P. 2d 334.
It is sufficient compliance with requirements of this section t h a t the board's findings state an ultimate fact, the discharge
of employee for union activities. The
board, an administrative body, may conclude, based on t h a t finding, t h a t defendant indulged in an unfair labor practice.
Teamsters Local Union Xo. 222 v. StrevellPaterson H a r d w a r e Co., 110 U. 388, 174 P.
2d 164.

review, the court may consider the board's
action under both. Southeast F u r n i t u r e Co.
v. Industrial Comm., 1<»<> U. 154, 111 P. 2d
153.
Evidence.
S t a t e labor relations bo.-nl is not a
court but primarily a fact-finding commission; its findings must be based on and
supported by competent, material, and relevant evidence. Building Service Employees
Local Xo. 59 v. Xewhouse Realty Co., 97
U. 502, 95 P. 2d 507.
Although the rules of evidence which
prevail in courts of law or equity are not
applicable to hearings before the labor
relations board, the material facts relied
on to support the orders must be reasonably inferable from the evidence, and the
procedure adopted by the board must afford all parties a reasonable opportunity
to present their evidence. Utah Labor Relations Board v. Broadway Shoe Repairing Co., 120 U. ZS3, 230 P. 2d 1072.
Collateral References.
Labor RelationsC=390.
51A C.J.S. Labor Relations § 32*.
48 Am. J u r . 2d 730, Labor and Labor
Relations S 1171.
Enforcement of labor board's order
against emplover's successors, assigns, or
the like, 46 A. L. R. 2d 592.
Jurisdiction of National Labor Relations Board over branch plant or separate
d e p a r t m e n t engaged in i n t r a s t a t e operations, where owner is engaged in interstate commerce in other plants or departments, 23 A. L. R. 2d 893.
State's power to enjoin violation of collective labor contract as affected by Federal Labor Relations Acts, 32 A. L. R.
2d S29.

Appeal and review.
Orders made under this section are appealable, while those made under former
section 34-1-9, present 34-20-9, are not;
however, when an order made pursuant to
this section is properly before a court for
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34-20-11. Hearings and investigations—Power of board—Witnesses—
Procedure.—For the purpose of all hearings and investigations, which, in
the opinion of the board, are necessary and proper for the exercise of
the powers vested in it by sections 34-20-9 and 34-20-10:
(1) The board, or its duly authorized agents or agencies, shall at all
reasonable times have access to, for the purpose of examination, and the
right to copy any evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded
against that relates to any matter under investigation or in question. Any
member of the board shall have power to issue subpoenas requiring the
attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of any evidence
that relates to any matter under investigation or in question, before the
board, its member, agent, or agency conducting the hearing or investigation.
Any member of the board, or any agent or agency designated by the board,
for such purposes, may administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses, and receive evidence. Such attendance of witnesses and the production of such evidence may be required from any place in the state at any
duly designated place of hearing.
(2) In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any
person, any district court of Utah within the jurisdiction of which the
inquiry is carried on or within the jurisdiction of which said person
guilty of contumacy or refusal to obey is found or resides or transacts
business upon application by the board shall have jurisdiction to issue to
such person an order requiring such person to appear before the board,
its member, agent, or agency, there to produce evidence if so ordered, or
there to give testimony touching the matter under investigation or in
question; and any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished
by said court as a contempt thereof.
(3) No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from
producing books, records, correspondence, documents or other evidence
in obedience to the subpoena of the board on the ground that the testimony
or evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him
to a penalty or forfeiture, but no individual shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction,
matter, or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed
his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence,
except that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying.
(4) Complaints, orders, and other processes and papers of the board,
its member, agent, or agency, may be served either personally, by certified
or registered mail, by telegraph, or by leaving a copy thereof at the
principal office or place of business of the person required to be served.
The verified return by the individual so serving the same setting forth
the manner of such service shall be proof of the same, and the return
post-office receipt or telegram receipt therefor when certified or registered
and mailed or telegraphed as aforesaid shall be proof of service of the same.
Witnesses summoned before the board, its member, agent, or agency, shall
be paid the same fees and mileage that are paid witnesses in the courts of
the state, and witnesses whose depositions are taken and the persons
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taking the same sliall severally be entitled to the same fees as arc paid
for like services in the courts of the state.
(5) The several departments and agencies of the state when directed
by the governor shall furnish the board, upon its request, all records,
papers, and information in their possession relating to any matter before
the board.
History: C. 1953, 34-20-11, enacted by
L. 1969, ell. 85, § 24.
Collateral References.
Labor Rtdatioii5>C=3521.

5 1 A C . J . S . Labor Relations § ri!)<*.
48 Am. J u r . 2d 73(5, Labor and Labor
Relations § 1171 et scq.

34-20-12. Willful interference—Penalty.—Any person who shall willfully resist, prevent, impede or interfere with any member of the board, or
any of its agents or agencies, in the performance of duties pursuant to
this act shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.
History: C. 1953, 34-20-12, enacted b y
L. 1969, ch. 85, § 25.

34-20-13. Right to strike.—Nothing in this act shall be construed so
as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike.
History: C. 1953, 34-20-13, enacted by
L. 1969, ch. 85, § 2 6 .
Collateral References.
Labor RelationsC=>365.
51A C.J.S. Labor Relations § 331.
48 Am. J u r . 2d 846, Labor and Labor
Relations § 1360.

Eligibiiitv of Mrikeis to obtain public
asMbtanee, 37 A. L. K. 3d 1303.
Labor law: ri^ht of public employees to
strike or engage in work stoppage, 37
A. L. "R. 3d 1147.
Riijlit of labor union to strike, picket, or
impose boycott to compel payment by emplover of fine or other penalty, 32 A. L. R.
2d 342.

CHAPTER 21
EIGHT-HOUR LAW
Section 34-21-1.
34-21-2.

Repealed.
Eight-hour day—Smelters, mines and related industries—Exceptions.

34-21-1. Repealed.
Repeal.
Section 34-21-1 (L. 1969, ch. 85, § 2 7 ) ,
relating to the eight-hour day on public

works and in penal institutions, was repealed by Laws 1971, ch. 73, § 1 1 . For
present provisions, &ee 34-30-8.

34-21-2, Eight-hour day—Smelters, mines and related industries—Exceptions.—The period of employment of working men in smelters and all
other institutions for the reduction or refining of ores or metals, shall be
eight hours per day, but work in excess of eight hours per day will not
constitute a violation of the provisions of this section if the industrial commission certifies in writing to an employer that such work in the employer's
institutions is not detrimental to the life, health, safety and welfare of
the working men. Such certification shall not issue unless interested parties
have been afforded an opportunity to present to the industrial commission
27

